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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ADMONISH THE JURY NOT TO 
TRANSFER GUILT TO DEFENDANT AS A RESULT OF THE 
PROSECUTOR'S NUMEROUS REFERENCES TO THE GUILTY PLEA OF 
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATOR WAS OBVIOUS AND 
AFFECTED DEFENDANT'S FUNDAMENTAL AND SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT 
TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
In its Brief, the State argues that Defendant "failed to 
establish any error that should have been obvious to the trial 
court.'' (See Brief of Appellee, p. 13) . By so arguing, the State 
inextricably equates, without any apparent exception, the obviousness1 
*In support of its obviousness argument, the State, in footnote 
2 of its Brief, cites United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203 (6th 
Cir. 1986), for the proposition that a trial court's failure to sua 
sponte give a cautionary instruction about a co-defendant's guilty 
plea is not plain error. The Christian case, however, is 
distinguishable from the instant case inasmuch as the co-defendant's 
guilty plea, unlike that in the instant case, was not blatantly 
referred to by the prosecutor in the State's opening argument. 
Furthermore, in the course of its analysis, the Christian court 
recognized that aggravating circumstances may exacerbate the 
prejudice of failing to give a cautionary instruction. Id. at 214. 
Such aggravating circumstances include (1) whether or not a 
cautionary instruction is given to the jury, (2) the way in which the 
plea is brought to the jury's attention, (3) the purpose for 
introducing the plea, (4) whether there is undue emphasis on the plea 
as it relates to the substantive aspects of the case, and (5) 
counsel's approach to the use of the plea. Id. The inquiry into the 
4 
element of plain error with the availability of "Utah authority"2 (Id. 
aggravating circumstances is to be one of "fairness" so as to 
"protect the substantive rights of the accused." Id. (quoting United 
States v. DeLucca, 630 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
All of the aggravating circumstances referred to by the 
Christian court are present in the instant case. First, there was no 
cautionary instruction given by the trial court. Second, the way in 
which the guilty plea was initially brought to the jury's attention 
was by way of the State's Opening Argument. Third, the passages 
quoted on pages 20 through 22 of the Brief of Appellant evidence an 
improper purpose by the prosecution to unduly color the jury's 
consideration of the co-defendant's guilty plea when deliberating. 
Fourth, the prosecution made numerous references and emphasized the 
fact that Sanchez' guilty plea arose out of the same "forgeries" and 
"scheme" before the trial court in Defendant's case. Finally, 
Defendant's appointed trial counsel did not utilize the guilty plea 
to attack Sanchez' credibility. Instead, appointed trial counsel 
waived opening argument (See Transcript of Trial, R. 276, line 2) . 
Then, on cross-examination, appointed trial counsel did not ask any 
questions of Ms. Sanchez with respect to her guilty plea as a co-
defendant on charges in the instant case (see Transcript of Trial, R. 
103-05). Moreover, appointed trial counsel did not ask any questions 
of Ms. Sanchez with respect to her guilty plea even after the 
prosecution recalled Ms. Sanchez as a witness (Transcript of Trial, 
R. 376-80). 
2The cases cited by the State on page 13 of its Brief are 
inapposite to the instant case, and if not inapposite, then 
distinguishable for the reasons that follow. In State v. Saunders, 
893 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the first case cited by the State, 
this court declined to reach the merits of the plain error claim due 
to the "Utah Supreme Court's struggle in dealing with unanimity 
problems." Id. at 589. Moreover, in State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 
(Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court did not reach the defendant's claim of plain error 
inasmuch as it involved an interpretation of a statutory requirement 
regarding findings by a trial court "and the trial court did not have 
the benefit of an appellate decision interpreting the statute's 
requirement . . ." Id. at 36. In contrast, the instant case 
involves numerous references by the prosecution to the guilty plea of 
the alleged co-conspirator, Susan Sanchez, and the obvious failure by 
the trial court, after each of those references, to advise the jury 
against transferring guilt to Defendant by way of guilt by 
association so as to protect Defendant's fundamental and substantive 
constitutional right to a fair trial. 
Finally, at page three of the Brief of Appellee, the State cites 
to State v. Cook, 881 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), for the 
proposition that the "primary reason for concluding that the error 
5 
at 13-14). Such a rationale is not only a distortion of the law 
underlying the plain error principle, but it fails to take into 
account the balancing utilized by the appellate court when confronted 
with a claim of plain error.3 
In State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 
814, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989), the Utah Supreme Court, in the course of 
discussing the "plainness" element of the doctrine of plain error, 
stated that "an error may be so harmful that we should exercise our 
discretion to correct it regardless of the lack of either an 
objection or objective obviousness." Id. at 36 n.ll. Hence, in 
cases where the error is so harmful, the appellate court may correct 
the error notwithstanding the absence of an objection or the lack of 
apparent obviousness or plainness of the error. 
Furthermore, on a number of occasions, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that plain error existed and reversed trial court rulings 
when, clearly, the error was not plain or obvious to the trial court. 
For example, in State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 
U.S. 988, 103 S.Ct. 341 (1982), the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
trial court's standards for determining when the death penalty should 
was not plain was the fact that the trial court did not have the 
benefit of a supreme court opinion on the issue." Notwithstanding 
the foregoing alleged proposition advanced by the State, the Cook 
court didf in fact, reach the merits of the plain error claim, 
reversing and remanding for a new trial. Id. 
3See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), where the Utah 
Supreme Court stated, "[T]he plain error . . . test . . . ultimately 
permit[s] the appellate court to balance the need for procedural 
regularity with the demands of fairness." Id. at 122 n.12 (citation 
omitted). 
6 
be applied even though the trial court thought that it was carrying 
out prior Utah Supreme Court opinions. In fact, the position taken 
by the trial court was not without foundation. Additionally, in 
State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931), the Utah Supreme 
Court reached a point that had neither been raised nor argued on 
appeal, notwithstanding the fact that an objection had been made to 
the trial court, which was improperly sustained. Id. at 350, 2 P.2d 
at 1056. Therefore, the error, under a plain error analysis, was 
trial counsel's failure to raise the trial court's error on appeal, 
from which follows that trial counsel's error would not, and could 
not, have been known to the trial court. 
In the instant case, at virtually every phase of Defendant's 
jury trial, the prosecution referred to the guilty plea of alleged 
co-conspirator and co-defendant Sanchez (Transcript of Trial, R. 272, 
lines 12-19 (the State's Opening Argument);4 R. 301-02 (the State's 
case-in-chief)/5 and R. 417, lines 10-16 (the State's Closing 
4During the State's opening argument, the prosecutor made the 
following remarks: 
This case involves a forged check scheme. 
You are going to hear testimony from five 
witnesses, but one of those witnesses is a young 
lady by the name of Susan Sanchez. Now, Susan 
Sanchez was a co-defendant in this particular 
scheme. She has already been convicted by plea 
and shefll testify to you as to the nature of 
that plea and what consideration she was given 
by the State for purposes of her testimony here 
today and you can evaluate her testimony in 
light of that. 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 272, lines 12-19) (Emphasis added). 
5During the State's case-in-chief, the prosecutor called Ms. 
Susan Sanchez, Defendant's alleged co-conspirator and co-defendant, 
7 
Argument) .6 The State, in the course of referring to Sanchez' guilty 
plea, emphasized that co-defendant Sanchez had pleaded guilty to the 
same charges and to the same "forgeries" that were before the trial 
court (See Transcript of Trial, R. 272, lines 14-16; R. 301, lines 9-
22). Notwithstanding the prosecution's constant references to 
as a witness (Transcript of Trial, R. 300, lines 16-17). In the 
course of examining Ms. Sanchez, the following exchange took place: 
MR. WILSON: Now, Susan, it's my recollection 
that we charged you in connection with this 
matter and that you pled guilty to two third 
degree felony counts; is that correct? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes. 
MR. WILSON: You also pled guilty to 
additional count or counts in Ogden in Weber 
County; is that correct? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes, I did. 
MR. WILSON: So you are currently serving a 
sentence in respect to the forgeries that are 
before this Court for purposes of this trial? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes. 
MR. WILSON: Okay. Were any promises made to 
you, Susan, as to other than the agreement that 
we would allow you to plead to two counts and 
dismiss the other counts or any promises made to 
you in connection with your testimony here 
today? 
MS. SANCHEZ: No. 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 75-76) (Emphasis added). 
6In the course of the State's closing argument, the prosecutor 
referred to the guilty plea of co-defendant Sanchez' by stating the 
following: 
I think Susan Sanchez was very believable in her 
testimony. You can look at her interest in the 
results of the trial. What did she have to 
gain? She has already been incarcerated as a 
result of her pleading guilty on charges in 
connection with these proceedings, so what what 
was there for her to gain by giving her 
testimony? 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 417) (Emphasis added.). 
8 
Sanchez' guilty plea, the trial court at no time, whatsoever, 
admonished or cautioned the jury to not transfer the guilt of 
Defendant's alleged co-conspirator and co-defendant to Defendant. 
By virtue of well-settled principles of law involving the 
constitutional right to a fair trial7 and the presumption of innocence 
in criminal trials8 and the blatant manner in which the prosecution 
referred to the guilty plea of alleged co-conspirator and co-
defendant Sanchez, it should have been obvious9 to the trial court10 
7The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury, . . . " 
8Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) provides that "[a] defendant in a 
criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of 
the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In the absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted." 
9Speaking to the obviousness of failing to advise jury in a case 
such as this, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit stated the following in United States v. Hansen, 544 F.2d 778 
(5th Cir. 1977): 
[T]here is no need to advise the jury or its 
prospective members that some one not in court, 
not on trial, and not to be tried, has pleaded 
guilty. The prejudice to the remaining parties 
who are charged with complicity in the acts of 
the self-confessed guilty participant is 
obvious. 
Id. at 780 (Emphasis added.). 
10In United States v. Baete, 414 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1969), the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
In cases where the jury has become aware of a 
codefendant's guilty plea, we think the 
appellate court should carefully focus its 
attention on the sufficiency of the corrective 
instruction. The significance of remedial 
instructions in such circumstances is pointed 
out in Freije v. United States wherein the court 
observed: 
It is generally held that it is proper 
9 
that the prosecutor's statements called to the jurors' attention 
matters they were not justified in considering in their 
deliberations. However, in the event that this Court determines that 
the error was not obvious, then this Court, based on the harmful 
nature of the error in failing to give a cautionary or limiting jury 
instruction, should exercise its discretion and correct the error 
notwithstanding the absence of an objection or lack of obviousness or 
plainness of the error. See Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 36 n.ll. The 
substantive use of Sanchez' guilty plea without any limiting 
instruction, whatsoever, unduly tilted the balance in favor of 
conviction, thereby prejudicially affecting Defendant's substantial 
and constitutional rights to a fair trial and running afoul of 
notions of fair play and due process. See generally Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct 629 (1935); United States v. Corona, 551 
F.2d 1386, 1388 (5th Cir. 1977). 
II. BECAUSE THE RECORD REVEALS THAT APPOINTED TRIAL 
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT WAS NOT THE PRODUCT OF A 
CONSCIOUSLY CHOSEN TRIAL STRATEGY, THE ISSUE 
CONCERNING THE STATE'S IMPROPER REFERENCES TO THE 
GUILTY PLEA OF ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATOR AND CO-DEFENDANT 
SANCHEZ IS NOT WAIVED AND IS RIPE FOR CONSIDERATION ON 
APPEAL. 
The State argues that even if the error was obvious, "defendant 
cannot claim prejudice because the record reflects that defendant's 
to receive the guilty plea of a 
codefendant, even in the presence of 
the jury, but this presupposes that 
cautionary instructions are given. 
Id. at 783 (emphasis included) (footnote omitted). 
10 
failure to object was based on his trial strategy." (See Brief of 
Appellee, p. 14). A closer review of the record indicates otherwise. 
In State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that an appellate court "may decline to consider the claim 
of plain error" when "trial counsel's actions amounted to an active, 
as opposed to a passive, waiver of an objection." Id. at 158. The 
Court further noted that the plain error rule "permits the appellate 
court to assure that justice is done, even if counsel fails to act to 
bring a harmfully erroneous ruling to the attention of the trial 
court." Id. "The plain error rule exists to permit review of trial 
court rulings as a way of protecting a defendant from the harm that 
can be caused by less-than-perfect counsel," id. at 159, and "to 
permit the appellate court to balance the need for procedural 
regularity with the demands of fairness." Id. at 158. 
In Bullock, trial counsel's conscious trial strategy was 
apparent from the record, which evinced that it was the strategy of 
defense counsel to attack the quality of the State's evidence in 
order to persuade the jury that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a conviction. Id. at 159. This strategy was apparent from 
defense counsel's cross-examination of the State's witnesses and by 
presenting countervailing testimony of defense experts, evidence of 
the defendant's good character and reputation for truthfulness, and 
the defendant's own denial testimony. Id.11 
nIn the course of arguing waiver, the State cites United States 
v. Handly, 591 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1979), for support. However, the 
11 
Unlike the trial strategy utilized by defense counsel in 
Bullock, Defendant's trial counsel in the instant case waived oral 
argument after the prosecution had made its first reference to the 
guilty plea of alleged co-conspirator and co-defendant Sanchez (See 
Transcript of Trial, R. 276, line 2). Then, after the prosecution 
focused on and again referenced the guilty plea of Sanchez during its 
case-in-chief and direct examination of Ms. Sanchez, appointed trial 
counsel, in a terse cross-examination, did not ask any questions of 
Ms. Sanchez about the guilty plea (See Transcript of Trial, R. 103-
05) . In fact, trial counsel did not ask any questions about the 
guilty plea even after the prosecution recalled Ms. Sanchez as a 
witness (See Transcript of Trial, R. 376-80). Then, after the 
prosecution again referred to the guilty plea during its closing 
argument, appointed trial counsel desperately attacked Ms. Sanchez' 
credibility by referring to the guilty plea as evidence that Ms. 
Sanchez had to be getting something in return for aiding the State 
(See Transcript of Trial, R. 423-24). Rather than a consciously 
chosen trial strategy, the record reveals that the failure to object 
was the result of inadvertence and neglect. This inadvertence and 
neglect is apparent from appointed trial counsel's desperate attempts 
consciously chosen trial strategy of defense counsel in Handly, like 
that in State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), was apparent from 
a defense by trial counsel that emphasized the guilty pleas of the 
defendant's co-conspirators and not a defense that was resorted to by 
the prosecution's independent references to the guilty pleas. Id. at 
1128. 
12 
to raise the issue of credibility of Ms. Sanchez at the late stage of 
closing arguments rather than on cross-examination. 
III. BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE OF WHAT WAS OBTAINED OR SOUGHT TO 
BE OBTAINED WAS BASED ON REMOTE SPECULATIVE 
POSSIBILITIES OF GUILT, IT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH THE CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT FOR SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
The State asserts that Defendant, in the course of arguing that 
the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of second 
degree felony Communications Fraud, "essentially argues that this 
Court should ignore the testimony of a prosecution witness." (See 
Brief of Appellee, p. 17). In the course of so arguing, the State 
argues that "credibility issues are left to the trier of fact." Id. 
Rather than ignore the testimony of co-defendant Sanchez, as the 
State attributes to Defendant's argument, Defendant argues that Ms. 
Sanchez' testimony, when closely reviewed, evinces the insufficiency 
of the evidence upon which the second degree felony conviction is 
based. 
To convict Defendant of second degree felony Communications 
Fraud, the State is required to prove all of the elements of 
Communications Fraud contained in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) 
beyond a reasonable doubt, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1) ,12 
including the element contained in § 76-10-1801 (1) (c) that the 
12Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) provides that "[a] defendant in 
a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element 
of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In the absence of such proof, the defendant shall be 
acquitted." 
13 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or 
exceeds $5,000." When confronted with an insufficiency of the 
evidence issue on appeal 
the role of the reviewing court is to determine 
(1) whether there is any evidence that supports 
each and every element of the crime charged, and 
(2) whether the inferences that can be drawn 
from that evidence have a basis in logic and 
reasonable human experience sufficient to prove 
each legal element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is not 
legally valid if it is based solely on 
inferences that give rise to only remote or 
speculative possibilities of guilt. 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993). 
The State's argument, which is premised upon a mathematical 
calculation of the alleged checks that Ms. Sanchez testified about at 
trial, fails to take into account that Ms. Sanchez' testimony about 
the number and amounts of the alleged checks basically rests on 
conjecture and speculation. The checks introduced and admitted by 
the prosecution as evidence during the State's case-in-chief total 
only $3,665.26 (See Brief of Appellant, p. 27 fn.10). Especially 
troubling, in the instant case, is the total lack of physical 
evidence of the checks that the prosecution argued make up the 
difference to establish the amount in excess of $5,000 for a second 
degree Communications Fraud conviction. In fact, a close review of 
Ms. Sanchez' testimony reveals merely conjecture as to the number and 
amount of checks that were allegedly cashed (See Transcript of Trial, 
R. 312-14) . The State does not tie any testimony of Ms. Sanchez to 
14 
the physical checks and locations13 where the checks were allegedly 
cashed to make up the difference to establish the amount in excess of 
$5,000. Other than the speculative and unclear testimony of Ms. 
Sanchez, the State presented no evidence that Defendant sought to 
obtain property or money in excess of the statutory requirement of 
$5,000. According to the Utah Supreme Court, "Criminal convictions 
cannot rest on conjecture or supposition; they must be established by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." See Workman, 852 P. 2d at 987 
(noting that the State's argument that "speculative inferences can 
constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt is to attack one of the 
most sacred constitutional safeguards at its core"). By virtue of 
the foregoing, the State failed to prove each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt, as it is required to do. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-501. This follows even when the evidence supporting the second 
degree' Communications Fraud conviction is viewed is a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. 
IV. INASMUCH AS A CLOSE COMPARISON OF THE RELEVANT 
STATUTES AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE OF THE 
INSTANT CASE REVEALS THAT COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD IS A 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF FORGERY, APPOINTED TRIAL 
COUNSEL DENIED DEFENDANT OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
At footnote 4 on page 18 of the Brief of Appellee, the State 
responds to Defendant's jurisdictional argument about crimes 
allegedly being committed in two counties by citing article I, § 12 
of the Utah Constitution, which states that an accused is entitled to 
an impartial jury drawn from the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed . . . ." This provision, 
however, does not address the question of whether the Davis County 
Attorney's Office and/or the District Court in and for Davis County 
have jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed outside of Davis 
County. 
15 
TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO 
OBJECT TO DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF BOTH FORGERY AND 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD.14 
In its responsive Brief, the State argues that "the elements of 
forgery do not encompass the elements for communications fraud" 
because "[c]ommunications fraud requires communication with a third 
party while forgery does not." (See Brief of Appellee, p. 26) . The 
State, however, misperceives the application of the lesser included 
offense analysis as applied to the facts in the instant case as well 
as general principles of double jeopardy upon which the lesser 
included offense analysis is based. 
Quoting the secondary test referred to in State v. Hill, 674 
P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Bradley, 
752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985) (per curiam), stated that in cases where 
crimes standing in a greater-lesser relationship have multiple 
variations, the appellate court "must therefore consider the evidence 
to determine whether the relationship existed between the specific 
variations of the crime actually proved at the defendant's trial." 
Id. at 877. This is consistent with the plain language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402(3), which states that an offense is included in the 
offense charged when "[i]t is established by proof of the same or 
less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged." 
14In light of the recent holding in State v. Patience, 323 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), which was issued on August 14, 
1997, Defendant concedes that should this Court follow the holding 
set forth in the Patience case, Defendant's argument concerning the 
consolidation of the eight counts of Forgery into one fails. 
16 
In the instant case, Defendant, by way of Amended Information, 
was charged with eight counts of Forgery and one count of 
Communications Fraud (See Amended Information, R. 57-61). The eights 
counts of Forgery allege, in turn, that Defendant 
as a party, with the purpose to defraud anyone 
or with knowledge he was facilitating a fraud to 
be perpetrated by anyone, did make, compete, 
execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish 
or utter any writing so that the writing or the 
making, completion, execution, authentication, 
issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another. 
(See Amended Information, R. 57-60) . At trial, the evidence as to 
alleged scheme utilized in the course of the forgeries included the 
following: 
MR. WILSON: All right. When you got to the 
store, what procedure did you follow at that 
point? 
MS. SANCHEZ: They'd hand me a check. 
MR. WILSON: Now, how would [Niki] hand you 
the check? Was it in any container or anything 
like that? 
MS. SANCHEZ: They were in an envelope. It was 
in an envelope. 
MR. WILSON: Okay. Was it just a plain envelope or 
can you remember? 
MS. SANCHEZ: I think it was just plain. I 
can't remember. 
MR. WILSON: Okay. So the check would be 
inside the envelope and you would have the ID 
and then what would you do? 
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MS. SANCHEZ: I would get out and go into the 
store and grocery shop, or go up to the customer 
service desk. 
MR. WILSON: Okay. Did you always follow the 
same procedure on each of those occasions that 
you went out and cashed checks that you just 
told us about that you did on the first 
occasion? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes. 
MR. WILSON: You were always handed the check? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes. 
MR. WILSON: Did you ever see the checks 
before you arrived at the merchants [sic] place? 
I mean, did they ever show you the checks ahead 
of time? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Oh, no. 
(Transcript of Trial, R. 311-14). Therefore, based on the evidence 
at trial, as set forth above, Defendant was allegedly a party to the 
utterance of the forged checks and not to the altering, making, 
completing, executing, authenticating, etc., or other variations of 
the crime as set forth in the Forgery statute at Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-
6-501 (1) . 
As applied to the facts and evidence presented at trial in the 
instant case, the utterance element of Forgery was relied upon by the 
prosecution in the course of convicting Defendant of Forgery. Under 
that particular variation of the crime of Forgery where utterance can 
and should be equated with the communication element of 
Communications Fraud as found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), 
Defendant could not have committed the greater crime of Forgery 
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without necessarily having committed the lesser included crime of 
Communications Fraud. See Hill, 61A P.2d at 97.15 Hence, Defendant 
cannot be convicted or punished for both.16 See Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-
1-402 (3) . 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse Defendant's convictions and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this Court's directions as stated in its 
opinion. 
15In light of the State's apparent concession that except for the 
communication element in the Communications Fraud statute, the 
elements of the crime of Forgery and Communications Fraud overlap, 
Defendant's analysis and comparison of elements focuses solely on the 
utterance and communicates elements of the respective crimes. 
16The rationale that Defendant should not be convicted for both 
Forgery and Communications Fraud is premised upon the general 
constitutional principles of double jeopardy prohibiting an accused 
from twice being put to trial for the same offense. See Article I, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution also prohibit the imposition of separate 
sentences for lesser included offenses. Article I, section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution provides that no person shall "be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense" while the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject 
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 
Furthermore, double jeopardy attaches "when an accused is put on 
trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid indictment 
(or information), and a jury has been sworn and impaneled." State v. 
Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358 (Utah 1979). Like the lesser included 
offense analysis, the double jeopardy analysis dictates, based on the 
attachment of double jeopardy, that the Communications Fraud 
conviction be dismissed. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant and 
novel issues in the instant appeal dealing with prosecutorial 
misconduct, insufficiency of evidence for a conviction of second 
degree communications fraud, and double jeopardy, which are matters 
of continuing public interest and which, based on the facts of the 
instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development in the 
area of criminal law case development for the benefit of bar and 
public. Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of 
disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the 
Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value 
and direction in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of September, 1997. 
/ M I N O \ D _ & WIGGINS, P.C. 
"*&6atLAi Wiggins 
Attorney^-rtSr Defendant 
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ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(11). 
22 
